Ad Hoc Diplomats

I just posted a revised version of a new article on the role of the president and the Senate in the appointment of special envoys and other types of irregular diplomatic agents. The piece will be coming out in the Duke Law Journal; here’s the abstract:

Article II of the Constitution grants the president power to appoint “Ambassadors” and “other public Ministers” with the advice and consent of the Senate. By all accounts, this language requires Senate confirmation for the appointment of resident ambassadors and other diplomats of similar rank and tenure. Yet these are hardly the only agents of U.S. foreign relations. Ad hoc diplomats — individuals chosen exclusively by the president to complete limited and temporary assignments — play a comparably significant role in addressing international crises, negotiating treaties, and otherwise executing foreign policy.

This Article critically examines the appointments process for such irregular agents. An orthodox view holds it permissible for the president to dispatch any ad hoc diplomat without Senate confirmation, but this view does not accord with the original meaning of Article II. Scrutinizing text and an extensive collection of original historical sources, I show that, under a formalist reading of the Constitution, the appointment of most ad hoc diplomats requires the advice and consent of the Senate because these agents are typically “public Ministers” and “Officers of the United States” under the Appointments Clause.

The analysis makes several contributions. First, it provides a thorough account of the original meaning of “public Ministers” — a term that appears several times in the Constitution but lacks precise contours in contemporary scholarship and practice. Second, for formalists, the analysis reorients longstanding debates about the process of treaty-making and empowers the Senate to exert greater influence over a wide variety of presidential initiatives, including communications with North Korea, the renegotiation of trade agreements, the campaign to defeat ISIS, and the stabilization of Ukraine, all of which depend on the work of ad hoc diplomats. At a time of trepidation over the nature of U.S. foreign policy, such influence might operate as a stabilizing force. Third, the analysis illuminates rhetorical and doctrinal maneuvers that have facilitated the rise of the modern presidency, including historical revisionism and the marginalization of international law as an input in constitutional interpretation. These maneuvers complicate the political valence of originalism and cast the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) — a key proponent of the orthodox view — as a motivated expositor of the separation of powers.

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The Ethics of Baiting and Switching in Law Review Submissions

The Marquette Law Review hosted a fantastic symposium on the “ethics of scholarship” back in September and will be publishing an issue dedicated to the topic in the coming months. My short contribution addresses the ethics of a practice that appears to occur at times in law review submissions–namely, the practice of strategically over-claiming the importance of a paper to law review editors in order to improve the prospects of a favorable placement, and then walking back the over-claim prior to releasing the paper to the public. Here’s the abstract:

Sometimes the authors of law review articles engage in a bait-and-switch: they insert exaggerated claims of novelty or significance into their submission to student editors and then, after securing a satisfactory offer of publication, moderate those claims in drafts made available to colleagues and the public. By doing so, the authors manage to improve their chances at a desirable placement and avoid unscholarly claims before peers.

This symposium essay suggests that baiting and switching is unethical, and then discusses potential ways to address it.

With the annual submission season upon us, I hope the essay helps to discourage a problematic practice.

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Egocentric Bias in Perceptions of Customary International Law

I just posted a draft of a chapter that I’m contributing to International Law as Behavior (Harlan G. Cohen & Timothy Meyer eds., forthcoming Cambridge University Press), an edited volume that will offer interdisciplinary analyses on a variety of topics in international law. Here’s the abstract for the chapter, which is available on SSRN:

A substantial body of research in social psychology suggests that egocentric biases inhibit our ability to discern norms. This chapter identifies and explains two of those biases – the False Consensus Effect and the False Uniqueness Effect – and then explores their relevance and implications for efforts to identify customary international law (CIL). Among other things, the analysis offers insights on the persistent objector rule, the origins and evolution of CIL, and the merits of rational choice models.

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Trade Negotiations & the Appointments Clause

Below is a short series of posts on the issue of whether it’s consistent with the Appointments Clause for the President to appoint treaty negotiators, such as those who would renegotiate NAFTA, without first obtaining case-specific advice and consent from the Senate. In short, I think that the original meaning of the Appointments Clause probably disfavors such a practice, but one expert on these sorts of issues partially disagrees.

The opening argument.

A response from Prof. Michael Ramsey.

My reply.

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A Closer Look at Congressional Foreign Travel

On Monday, Paul Singer at USA Today reported new data on the burgeoning practice of congressional foreign travel. According to Singer, federal legislators spent more government funds venturing abroad in 2016 than any other year in the past decade. Roughly 40% of the trips cost over $10,000 each. The Senate Armed Services Committee spent more than any other, and the House Intelligence Committee experienced a big jump in expenses under the leadership of Rep. Devin Nunes (R-CA), who issued a directive for Committee members to “spend more time in the field.” These are important developments that suggest both the utility of what I’ve called “legislative diplomacy” and the risk of abuse as members of Congress engage in the practice with greater regularity. We also know, however, that the U.S. Government is not the only source of funding—members of Congress also rely on private sponsors. To name just one example, Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) recently accepted sponsorship from a nonprofit organization in making a controversial trip to Syria, where she met with Bashar al-Assad.

Which raises the question: How much do we know about this separate domain of privately funded congressional foreign travel? More specifically, how common are non-governmental sponsorships? Has reliance on private sources become more or less common over time? Which members of Congress have participated? Where did they go? And who paid for it? Continue reading

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A Legal Analysis of Rep. Tulsi Gabbard’s Trip to Syria

Rep. Tulsi Gabbard (D-HI) has drawn attention in recent weeks for leading a delegation to Syria and Lebanon, where she reportedly met with government leaders, refugees, and members of civil society. The stated purposes were to engage in fact-finding and promote an end to the Syrian war, but details about the trip have raised questions about its wisdom and legality. In this post, I’ll elaborate on the relevant legal issues and supplement the news coverage by offering additional context for what’s taken place.

By way of background, Rep. Gabbard’s trip has proven controversial for a number of reasons: She reportedly declined to inform House leadership in advance, met with Bashar al-Assad, toured with officials from a Lebanese political party that actively supports Assad, and received funding from an American organization that counts one of those same officials as its executive director. Moreover, both before and after traveling to Syria, the congresswoman channeled some of Assad’s positions on the war in statements to the public. Two weeks ago, amid mounting scrutiny, she pledged personally to reimburse her sponsor, but critics have continued to denounce the trip and Rep. Gabbard for violating the Logan Act and House ethics rules. As I explain below, the arguments so far have been unpersuasive, but commentators have neglected an important angle of approach. Continue reading

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Finding Customary International Law

I just posted the final, published version of my paper Finding Customary International Law, which came out in the Iowa Law Review last month. It’s available here.

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